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WORK IN PROGRESS
This is a Go web app that lets you store a securely encrypted note that may be unlocked in the event of an emergency or untimely tragedy.
Basically you write a note and leave your e-mail address, and the note is encrypted using AES-256 with a very strong, randomly generated Diceware pass phrase. The server does not store your e-mail address or pass phrase anywhere in a recoverable form.
An example use case:
I want to make sure that, in case of an unexpected tragedy, that my family is able to access my Password Manager vault to log into my accounts.
So I go and create a secure note on Dethnote. Enter my email address and write my note.
The server generates a strong, random Diceware passphrase and encrypts my note with it and tells me what the passphrase is.
I write it down on a piece of paper that I put in my wallet: "In case of emergency, visit <dethnote url> and enter this password:"
If something happens and somebody finds the paper and enters the password, I get an e-mail notifying me that the password has been used and that I have 72 hours to respond. If I don't answer, I am presumed dead and the secure note will be decrypted.
If I got mugged and my wallet was stolen, no big deal: I can just go and re-encrypt with a new password at my earliest convenience. Even if the criminal tried to decrypt my note, I have 72 hours to prevent it from being unlocked.
Creating a Message
As the end user who wants to create an encrypted note:
- Go to the web app homepage and scroll down to create a new note.
- Provide your email address so we can verify you control the account. This is because, when your note is being decrypted, we will send you a confirmation e-mail with actions you may take. If you don't respond to the e-mail in time, your message will be decrypted, so it's important that we have a verified e-mail address to go with your message.
- Choose how long of a password you want to have generated for you. Six words or more are good, but I recommend eight.
- Choose what "timeout window" you want to be enforced when somebody tries to decrypt your note. The default is 72 hours. This means if your password is entered, you will get a notification e-mail and have 72 hours to respond to it, before your message will be decrypted.
- Finally, write the message that you want to protect.
- Submit the message. This will encrypt it with a random password and send you
a confirmation e-mail with details.
- The confirmation page tells you what the password is. You can not log in with the password yet, though, until you verify the email address.
- A random "verify token" is created along with your message. When you click the verification link in your e-mail, all that happens is the app puts that verify token on your browser's session.
- When you enter your password after clicking the verify link, your email
address will be confirmed and you will be given options what to do next.
- You can re-encrypt with a new random password.
- You can delete the message.
- You can replace the message with a new one.
Now you may log out. The next time your password is entered, the program will enter the Decryption Routine.
After your email is verified, if somebody (or you) goes to open the message up by providing the password, the app will enter the Decryption Routine on that message.
- The user who wants to decrypt the message must also provide their email address.
- This is to verify that the e-mail configuration is working as normal. If the server can't send out an e-mail, then it can't notify the owner of the secure note that the Decryption Routine has begun!
- The requester clicks on a link in their e-mail to verify their e-mail address.
- The owner of the note is sent an e-mail to notify them that the Decryption
Routine has started. The owner has 72 hours (default) to respond to the
e-mail. The email itself contains immediate actionable links:
- You can cancel the request. This keeps the password the same but cancels the Decryption Routine.
- You can delete the message completely, preventing it from being opened.
- You can immediately authorize it to be opened now.
- When the timeout window expires or the owner of the note authorizes the access, the request is e-mailed to notify them that the note is now able to be decrypted.
- The requester goes back to the web app and enters the password. This time they are allowed to access the note.
After a note is decrypted, the user viewing it may take actions on it:
- Do nothing and close their browser session. The next time the password is used, immediate access is granted to the note.
- Lock the note back down. This will cause the Decryption Routine to run again the next time the password is used.
- Delete the note.
- Re-encrypt it with a new random password.
- Replace the note with a new version while keeping the same password.
- The randomly generated passwords are never stored anywhere in a recoverable fashion.
- The password is hashed with bcrypt with a slow iteration count that will resist brute force attacks. The Diceware passwords themselves are also long enough to resist brute forcing just in general.
- The hash of the bcrypt password is used as the identifier on disk where the data is stored.
Literally everything about the note is encrypted.
The bcrypt+SHA256 hash serves as the key for AES-128 in CBC mode which is used to encrypt the contents of the data files.
On disk there are two files stored with every note:
meta.binis an AES-256 encrypted JSON document that stores the metadata about the note: the owner's email address, verified email status, the bcrypt hash of the Diceware password, etc.
message.binis an AES-256 encrypted plain text document that stores the actual body of the message you have written.
When the web app is dealing with the encrypted note after it received the
password (or generated the new one for new notes), it only deals with
meta.bin while it's trying to validate email addresses and run through
the Decryption Routine. This way the plain text of your message is rarely
ever in the application's working memory.
Only when access has been fully granted to decrypt the message will the
message.bin file be opened.
Zero Admin Visibility
The admin of the web server has zero visibility into any of the data in the service.
- The filesystem is just full of hexadecimal path names leading to files encrypted with AES-256.
- No e-mail addresses are visible to the admin, because those are stored inside those encrypted files.
- The admin can't snoop on other peoples messages because they are very
- Strong Diceware pass phrases that would resist brute force attacks for millions of years even with a fast hashing algorithm.
- Dethnote uses the bcrypt hashing algorithm with a slow iteration count making brute forcing all the harder.
- The admin can't enumerate what passwords even exist. All he can see is the hexadecimal data paths, but doesn't know what the passwords are, and can't even tell whose files belong to who. And brute forcing random Diceware passwords is practically impossible.
Robustness and "Offline Mode"
This service relies heavily on a reliable e-mail server for sending out verification e-mails, Decryption Routine warning e-mails, and so-on.
But this is the real world and web servers aren't always reliable.
On the web, the service will naturally self-test the e-mail system: before you can decrypt a note, you have to verify an e-mail address. This ensures that the e-mail system is working, so that when the Decryption Routine begins, it will be able to send an e-mail to the note owner.
But I mainly wrote this service for myself, and so it has an "Offline Mode" that works in absence of a running web server or e-mail configuration.
My web server backs up to my desktop PC at home, and so there will always be a copy of this application and its database of encrypted notes there. The command line interface of the program allows you to immediately decrypt and open a note that you have a password for. Example:
# Open a note with this password: % dethnote -open "viewable require broom taunt spoiled" Here is the contents of the note!
Note that this doesn't change any of the security considerations of the service. The passwords are still just as hard to brute force. All this "offline mode" does is bypass the need for e-mail validation and minimum timeouts before opening notes.